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Cross-border mass evacuations of refugees are complex operations that require the support of the inter-
national community, which must agree to receive the evacuees. However, while they may be effective in 
evacuating a portion of the population at risk, they could leave behind non-evacuated refugees. In that 
case, a comprehensive analysis of how evacuations impact the protection spaces of the non-evacuated 
is to be carried out. Being highly visible and disruptive programmes, refugee mass evacuations also carry 
distinguishable political elements and can be instrumentalised for that. This essay researches the UNHCR 
evacuation programme from Libya. The programme has successfully evacuated circa 4,500 persons to 
safety, yet there are concerns regarding its scalability and impact on protection spaces. In Libya, UNHCR 
was forced to close a new dedicated facility after only 15 months, and reports emerged that damaged the 
agency’s reputation and questioned its work. In Niger and Rwanda, where evacuees are hosted pend-
ing resettlement, the proceedings require time, which slows the whole process. On the other side of the 
Mediterranean, Italy and the EU use the evacuation programme as their ‘humanitarian alibi’ for restrictive 
policies, making it harder for the refugees in Libya to escape the cycle of detention, exploitation, and 
abuses in which they are trapped. The Libya operations’ problems reveal many details of the complexity, 
inherent risks, and moral dilemmas of evacuating refugees. 
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1. Introduction
International evacuations of refugees are complex operations that involve multiple countries and stake-
holders and impact multiple protection spaces, understood in the broadest sense. This paper researches 
how international evacuations may occur by relying on available policy documents on internal evacuations 
and introducing a case study. Since 2017, a mass evacuation of refugees has been taking place from Libya, 
led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).1 This essay will seek to understand 
how international refugee evacuations may occur, what role UNHCR has in them, and what are the risks as-
sociated with such programmes. The Libya evacuation programme is of interest due to both its numerical 
relevance and as it sits at the centre of a route to Europe, making it at the forefront of much of the political 
debate regarding refugee onward movement and protection.
The paper will first introduce a review of existing literature on protection in conflict and protection of ref-
ugees, effective protection, and protection space. By defining those core concepts, the essay will establish 
which lenses will be used to analyse the topic. In the following section, the essay will review available 
materials on how UNHCR contemporarily engages in evacuations of refugees by using emergency reset-
tlements through Emergency Transit Facilities (ETFs)2 to decrease waiting times in the departure country.3 
The Libya case study will research a large-scale implementation of the ETF mechanism. With evacuations to 
ETFs in Niger and Rwanda, from where refugees are resettled, and direct evacuations to Italy.4 
The last dimension that is discussed regards the risks of evacuations on the protection spaces of the 
non-evacuated, locally and regarding onward movement. The paper will propose a framework of analysis, 
in which relevance is given to the efforts regarding alternatives to detention in Libya and to barriers to 
onward movement. On the latter, the paper will research the risk of instrumentalisation, in particular re-
garding regional containment policies. It will conclude that evacuations may be used as political and moral 
justifications of State behaviours that contravene the spirit and possibly the provisions of refugee law. In 
the latest part, the conclusions will capitalise on the research by integrating the publicly available policy 
documents on internal evacuations with elements relevant to refugees’ international evacuations.
1  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Niger Factsheet: Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) - August 2020’ (2020).
2  UNHCR, ‘Information Note: Emergency Resettlement and the Use of Temporary Evacuation Transit Facilities. Annual Tripartite Consul-
tations on Resettlement Geneva, 6 – 8 July 2010’ (2010) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4bf3adfb2.html> accessed 10 June 2020.
3  UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Emergency Transit Facilities: Timisoara, Romania / Manila, Philippines / Humenné, the Slovak Republic’ 
(2011) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dddec3a2.html> accessed 10 June 2020.
4  UNHCR, ‘Evacuation Factsheet - Libya’ (2020) <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/111?sv=0&geo=0> accessed 13 October 2020.
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2. Literature Review
Humanitarian evacuations may occur for several reasons. However, they are generally correlated to a space 
that is not conducive to protection and in which the affected populations are at risks of severe abuses and 
violations.5 To set the stage for a refugee evacuations analysis, the paper will first discuss the foundational 
notions and establish some theoretical perspectives. It is useful to remember that while the term ‘protec-
tion’ is vastly used in the humanitarian sector, there is no universal definition. One, introduced by the ICRC 
in the late-1990s,6 is the most widely accepted:
The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of 
the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human 
rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.7 
However, some propose a different approach. For instance, Bonwick and Bradley suggest that protection 
should focus on physical safety and protection from violence.8 Others criticise the ICRC definition as too 
broad and lacking prioritisation among the vast array of rights and objectives.9 To operationalise it, IASC 
and the Global Protection Cluster suggest an approach based on reducing harm by diminishing exposure 
to threat and vulnerability among the affected population.10 
To mitigate risks connected to lack of specificity, the ICRC introduced the ‘protection egg’ framework, which 
categorises protection activities in responsive (such as an evacuation), remedial (resettlement), or environ-
ment-building.11 The model aims to list humanitarian actions in a non-hierarchical intertwined manner,12 
stressing that the different spheres do not happen in isolation but in combination.13 This understanding 
of protection, which this essay will employ, assumes that no humanitarian action occurs in isolation. It 
should also be stressed that the primary responsibility for protection lies with the State.14 When States are 
unable or unwilling to meet their international human rights obligations, humanitarian agencies engage 
in protection activities,15 therefore in surrogacy. As surrogate agents of protection, the role of humanitarian 
agencies is inherently political,16 and their participation in the delivery of protection has an impact on the 
humanitarian space in which they work.17 
As protection is multidimensional, it encompasses a wide range of activities and objectives. That it is inher-
ently political means it is no easy task to assess whether protection activities are carried out effectively. One 
angle for analysis is proposed by Matthews, who links the effectiveness of protection to the level at which 
international law instruments are best combined to produce the most protective effects.18 Darci interprets 
effectiveness in the context of humanitarian action as the ‘efficacy in achieving humanitarian objectives’.19 
On the other hand, Bradley disputes that there is a tendency toward under specificity of humanitarian 
5  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable, ‘Trapped in Conflict: Evaluating Scenarios to Assist At-
Risk Civilians’ (2015).
6  Pierre Gentile, ‘Humanitarian Organizations Involved in Protection Activities: A Story of Soul-Searching and Professionalization’ (2011) 
93 International Review of the Red Cross 1165.
7  Sylvie Giossi Caverzasio, Strengthening Protection in War: A Search for Professional Standards: Summary of Discussions among Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Organizations (International Committee of the Red Cross, Central Tracing Agency and … 2001); Global Protection Cluster 
(GBP), ‘Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’ (Global Protection Cluster Working Group 2010).
8  Andrew Bonwick, ‘Who Really Protects Civilians?’ (2006) 16 Development in Practice 270; Miriam Bradley, Protecting Civilians in War: The 
ICRC, UNHCR, and Their Limitations in Internal Armed Conflicts (First edition, Oxford University Press 2016).
9  Bradley (n 8). 
10  Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights through Humanitarian Action (2002).
11  Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick, Protection: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies (Oxfam Publishing 2005) <https://www.devel-
opmentbookshelf.com/doi/book/10.3362/9780855988869> accessed 6 October 2019.
12  Anne Evans Barnes, ‘Realizing Protection Space for Iraqi Refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon’ 36.
13  Caverzasio (n 7).
14  Caelin Briggs, ‘Mass Evacuations: Learning from the Past’ [2015] Forced Migration Review 3; Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7).
15  Barnes (n 12).
16  Thomas G Weiss, ‘Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action’ (1999) 13 Ethics & International Affairs 1; Jeff L Holzgrefe and Robert O 
Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press 2003); Dorothea Hilhorst and Bram J Jansen, 
‘Humanitarian Space as Arena: A Perspective on the Everyday Politics of Aid’ (2010) 41 Development and change 1117.
17  Hilhorst and Jansen (n 16).
18  Hannah Matthews, ‘The Interaction between International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law: Seeking the Most 
Effective Protection for Civilians in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2013) 17 The International Journal of Human Rights 633.
19  James Darcy, ‘Acts of Faith? Thoughts on the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Action’, Social Science Research Council seminar series “The 
Transformation of Humanitarian Action”, New York (2005) 1.
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protection objectives, which hinders effective protection delivery.20 After introducing some elements on 
refugee protection, this essay will understand the effectiveness of protection as related to its impact on 
multiple protection spaces. 
2.1 Protecting refugees
The notion of refugee protection is related to the ICRC definition of humanitarian protection while adding 
some elements, mainly concerning the global and international scale of the refugee situation and the need 
for solutions. In describing refugee protection, UNHCR uses a definition similar to the ICRC’s, amending it 
by specifying that refugee protection focuses on refugees and asylum seekers’ rights, and refugee law is at 
its core.21 Notably, UNHCR, when engaged in IDP situations, employs the ICRC definition to describe the ra-
tionale for its protection activities.22 On the other hand, the objectives of protection activities for refugees, 
who may enjoy the protection of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees23 and relevant regional 
treaties and directives, is not just ‘ensuring full respect for the rights’.24  Refugees need decreased risks of 
violations and abuses, but also solutions to their displacement.25 Goodwin-Gill in 1989 defines refugee 
protection’s effectiveness as the degree of realisation of the protection objective of re-establishing ‘the 
refugee within a community’.26
Others instead focus on the objective and effectiveness of refugee protection as being mainly related to 
freedom of movement. Long suggests that refugee protection’s broader objective should be to secure ref-
ugees the right to migrate, as cross-border movements are effective protection strategies implemented by 
refugees themselves.27 The cross-border movement is indeed central to refugee law, and non-refoulement 
is its cornerstone.28 Refugee protection, spatiality, and spaces of protection are deeply connected notions. 
Stevens points out that, as the responsibility for protection lies with the State, refugee protection correlates 
to the level of protection citizens of a country enjoys, and that ‘refugees can expect differential treatment 
depending on where they are based and who provides the protection’.29
UNHCR defines the protection of refugees as effectively realised when:
There is no likelihood of persecution, of refoulement or of torture or other cruel and degrading treat-
ment; there is no other real risk to the life of the person concerned;  there is a genuine prospect of an 
accessible durable solution in or from the asylum country, within a reasonable timeframe; pending 
a durable solution, stay is permitted under conditions which protect against arbitrary expulsion and 
deprivation of liberty and which provide for adequate and dignified means of subsistence; and, the 
unity and integrity of the family is ensured, and the specific protection needs of the affected persons, 
including those deriving from age and gender, are identified and respected.30
According to the agency’s view, there are both elements of protection against risks alongside the avail-
ability of solutions. No mention of freedom of movement is present. Paradoxically, the notion of ‘effective 
protection’ is used to justify refugees’ forced return and asylum-seekers to their first countries of asylum.31 
20  Bradley (n 8).
21  Barnes (n 12).
22  UNHCR, ‘Policy on UNHCR’s Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement’ (2019).
23  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 1951 (189 UNTS 137).
24  Caverzasio (n 7).
25  Sara Pantuliano and others, The ‘Protection Crisis’: A Review of Field-Based Strategies for Humanitarian Protection in Darfur (ODI 2006).
26  Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Language of Protection’ (1989) 1 International Journal of Refugee Law 6, 17.
27  Katy Long, ‘When Refugees Stopped Being Migrants: Movement, Labour and Humanitarian Protection’ (2013) 1 Migration Studies 4.
28  Susan Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective Protection”?’ (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 696; Barnes 
(n 12).
29  Dallal Stevens, ‘What Do We Mean by Protection?’ (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 233, 259.surprisingly, 
the meaning of protection is not without ambiguity. ‘Domestic protection’ can be distinguished from ‘international protection’; the sense attribut-
ed to protection within the 1951 Refugee Convention contrasts with that of the 1950 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR
30  UNHCR, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas (UNHCR Geneva 2009) Para. 153 (emphasis added).
31  Stephen H Legomsky, ‘Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective 
Protection’ 111; Stevens (n 29).surprisingly, the meaning of protection is not without ambiguity. ‘Domestic protection’ can be distinguished from 
‘international protection’; the sense attributed to protection within the 1951 Refugee Convention contrasts with that of the 1950 United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR
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Regarding protection work, it is relevant to note that, traditionally, UNHCR is more inclined to approach 
protection from a legal perspective, promoting legal and policy changes. For comparison, ICRC focuses 
more on protection in practice.32 Moreover, while UNHCR has acquired a role as Global Protection Cluster 
lead for the protection of IDPs, its core mandate and tradition is the protection of refugees. That usually 
happens to be in countries of asylum that are, to different degrees, stable. However, in some circumstances, 
the agency might have to protect refugees caught in humanitarian crises in third countries, in which the 
space for protection is severely curtailed. In those cases, refugees’ protection needs may be heightened,33 
and the risk they will fall into protection gaps is exceptionally high.34 Moreover, the natural counterpart for 
UNHCR, the State,35 might be fragmented, ineffective and absent. As ‘protection space’ may be tough to 
construct in those cases, the effectiveness of protection actions diminishes, and protection solutions are 
harder to find. 
2.2 Protection Space 
Protection space is a multifaceted concept and not to be confused with the notion of humanitarian space 
or operational space. It vastly relies on an approach to spatiality, social and physical places of protection 
and movement. Spatiality is an area that has not yet been mainstreamed in refugee studies, although calls 
for it have been made.36 Refugeehood and spatiality are intuitively connected, at least materially. For in-
stance, some suggest that displacement is a protection strategy to some degree, although this is disput-
ed.37 Moreover, refugeehood is connected to many elements of spatiality and places, such as camps or 
urban spaces. Interestingly, UNHCR only began talking of a protection space when the agency recognised 
the need to protect refugees in urban spaces proactively. Its urban refugees’ policy describes it as ‘the ex-
tent to which a conducive environment exists for the internationally recognised rights of refugees to be 
respected and their needs to be met’.38
While it has a very material element, spatiality is to be understood as the relationship between physical 
and social spaces. After noting that the humanitarian sector traditionally employs a non-spatial analysis of 
protection, focusing on a legal understanding of rights, Boano suggests that a focus should be dedicated 
to ‘matters of physical and social protection that may depend on spatial relations’.39 The scholar stresses the 
many ‘spaces’ that characterise humanitarian action, like camps, other types of shelters, formal and not, 
and detention centres.40 Accordingly, spaces should not be understood as separated from protection. Still, 
through its impact on creating social and political interaction, the former, positively or negatively, directly 
impact the latter. In her analysis of the notion of space in refugee studies, Brun notes that space is a social 
construct, ‘a particular articulation of those relations, a particular moment in those networks of social rela-
tions and understandings’.41
32  Bradley (n 8).
33  Sanjula Weerasinghe and others, ‘On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster’ (2015) 
3 Journal on Migration and Human Security 26.
34  Khalid Koser, ‘Non-Citizens Caught up in Situations of Conflict, Violence and Disaster’ (2014) 45 Forced Migration Review 43–45.
35  Bradley (n 8).
36  Cathrine Brun, ‘Reterritorilizing the Relationship between People and Place in Refugee Studies’ (2001) 83 Geografiska Annaler: Series 
B, Human Geography 15.Human Geography 15.”,”plainCitation”:”Cathrine Brun, ‘Reterritorilizing the Relationship between People and Place in 
Refugee Studies’ (2001
37  Camillo Boano, ‘“Violent Spaces”: Production and Reproduction of Security and Vulnerabilities’ (2011) 16 The Journal of Architecture 
37.
38  UNHCR, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas (n 32) Para: 20.
39  Boano (n 27) 37.
40  Boano (n 37).
41  Brun (n 36) 15.especially contributions from anthropology and geography. A main distinction is drawn between two understand-
ings of space and place; an essentialist conception, stating a natural relationship between people and places and an alternative conception 
attempting to de-naturalize the relationship between people and places. The consequences of applying different conceptions of space and 
place for the development of refugee policies and representations of refugees and displaced persons are addressed. For many displaced persons, 
displacement is experienced as being physically present at one place, but at the same time having a feeling of belonging somewhere else. It is 
argued that though attempts to de-naturalize the relationship between people and places have been important for how the refugee experience 
is conceptualized, there has been too much focus on imagination accompanied by a neglect of the local perspective of migrants and displaced 
people. In the local perspective of forced migration, the present lives of displaced people are emphasized. Especially the attitudes from the host 
communities, the policy environment that displaced people are part of, and their livelihood opportunities are the focus of regard. ‘Territoriality’ 
and ‘reterritorialization’ of the relationship between people and places are discussed as tools to analyse the local perspective of forced migra-
tion in general and the strategies of internally displaced persons and their hosts in Sri Lanka in particular.”,”container-title”:”Geografiska Annaler: 
Series B, Human Geography”,”DOI”:”10.1111/j.0435-3684.2001.00087.x”,”ISSN”:”0435-3684, 1468-0467”,”issue”:”1”,”language”:”en”,”page”:”15-25”,”-
source”:”Crossref”,”title”:”Reterritorilizing the relationship between people and place in refugee studies”,”volume”:”83”,”author”:[{“family”:”Brun”,”-
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A different approach to protection space, and more in line with the UNCHR definition, is introduced by 
Barnes, who defines it as ‘an environment conducive to the facilitation’42 of protection. The scholar also 
suggests that protection space is composed of two elements, physical space and action space, with the 
latter being the social space of individuals. They can make decisions and move, which is, by nature, fluid 
and prone to changes over time.43 Protection space is, therefore, in its essence, never fixed. It can some-
times deteriorate or be structurally inadequate to be a place of effective protection.44 Zetter’s under-
standing of protection space is similar, as the author suggests that it is ‘both a physical and metaphorical 
term’.45 Somehow complementary or linked46 but different to the concept of protection space is the 
humanitarian space.47 The notion has no defined meaning, while it is generally understood as humanitar-
ian agencies’ operating environment.48 Barnes somehow mixes the two dimensions, stating that ‘before 
UNHCR can engage in any protection activities […] an environment which enables such activities to be 
carried out – sometimes referred to as protection space – is required’.49
Accounting for the different approaches, it appears that there is a general recognition of a protection 
space’s existence and social nature, in which refugees can enjoy their rights. The protection space should 
not be limited to the analysis of urban places, as per UNHCR policy. It is a powerful key to the study of hu-
manitarian action and its impact. Moreover, as protection space is in constant change, protection actors 
should aim for protection activities to impact it positively. The notion is also instrumental when research-
ing refugees’ mass evacuations: evacuations are spatial, and they are rooted in the idea that there is not 
enough available protection space at the location of evacuation, so it should be searched elsewhere. 
However, as illustrated below, evacuations, while they attempt to construct a protection space through a 
transfer, also have an impact on the local social space from which persons are evacuated, and, as they are 
positively disruptive, they may affect protection spaces elsewhere.
2.3 Refugee Protection and Evacuations
Protecting refugees through evacuations is no novelty. An earlier proponent of a ‘right to evacuation’, Gib-
ney proposed a more pro-active role for the refugee protection regime, suggesting a role for humanitarian 
agencies to facilitate civilians’ outward movements when trapped in conflicts.50 As Long suggests, ‘inter-
national refugee protection depends, at a basic level, on freedom of movement’.51 Therefore a reasonable 
objective of a mass evacuation is that this freedom of movement is enhanced due to a mass evacuation 
effort, and not shrunk. The most notorious mass evacuation of refugees in modern history is Kosovars’ 
mass transfer from modern-day North Macedonia, then FYROM. Macedonia’s humanitarian transfer, as it 
was labelled at the time of implementation, during the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, was aimed at promoting 
burden-sharing and at avoiding Macedonia closing its borders52 to a mass influx of refugees – 344,500 in 
nine weeks.53 The programme was successful in its purpose, with Macedonia leaving its borders open and 
averting worse humanitarian consequences for Kosovars refugees. It is considered an instance of an effec-
tive burden-sharing agreement.54 
given”:”Cathrine”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2001”,4]]}},”locator”:”15”}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/
csl-citation.json”} 
42  Barnes (n 12) 1.
43  Barnes (n 12).
44  ibid.
45  Roger Zetter, ‘Protection in Crisis’ [2015] Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era 5.
46  Barnes (n 12).
47  Hilhorst and Jansen (n 16); E Abild, ‘Creating Humanitarian Space: A Case Study of Somalia’ (2010) 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 67.
48  Abild (n 47).
49  Barnes (n 12) 11.
50  Mark Gibney, ‘Reconciling Refugee Relief and Humanitarian Intervention: The Need to Recognize a Right to Evacuation’ (1993) 16 In 
Defense of the Alien 146.
51  Katy Long, ‘In Search of Sanctuary: Border Closures, “Safe” Zones and Refugee Protection’ (2013) 26 Journal of Refugee Studies 458, 
458.
52  Michael Barutciski and Astri Suhrke, ‘Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovatons in Protection and Burden‐sharing’ (2001) 14 
Journal of Refugee Studies 95.
53  Donèo Donev, Silvana Onceva and I Cligorov, ‘Refugee Crisis in Macedonia during the Kosovo Conflict in 1999’ (2002) 43 Croatian 
Medical Journal 184.
54  Katy Long, ‘No Entry! A Review of UNHCR‟ s Response to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Refugee Influx’ [2010] Report for UN-
HCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service.
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Macedonia’s initial threat to close its borders was rooted in the State not wanting the mass influx to have 
a radical effect on the country’s demography. Macedonia had an Albanian-ethnicity minority, and Koso-
var were mainly ethnically Albanians. In the context of a humanitarian operation partly run by NATO,55 
UNHCR requested the international community to evacuate Kosovars refugees from Macedonia.56 Many 
States agreed to resettle refugees, though some only offering ‘temporary protection’. In this instance, ac-
tion by the international community successfully created new protection and safe spaces through inter-
national evacuations’ strategic use.57 
However, the decision was criticised by human rights and refugee law scholars and activist, as it allegedly 
eroded the principle of asylum and the obligation of states under international law.58 Instead, supporters 
stressed that the mass evacuations were a realisation of the principle of burden-sharing that underpins 
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and that its successes are proof of solidarity.59 Barut-
ciski and Suhrke argue, positioning themselves between the two perspectives, that the evacuations and 
burden-sharing were a legitimate position due to the situation’s exceptionality and that, when a country 
of first asylum risks importing the conflict or be seriously destabilised, evacuations should be consid-
ered.60 The Kosovo-Macedonia experience of burden-sharing led to EXCOM Conclusion in 2004, which 
recommends that States develop and are prepared to use evacuations or humanitarian transfers in the 
case of mass influx to a third country,61 therefore recognising their role in preventing refoulement. 
Kosovars’ mass evacuation was successful in temporarily enlarging protection space, preventing the 
refoulement of Kosovars at the border and guaranteeing the minimum freedom of movement required to 
seek asylum. However, it is helpful to note that generally, evacuations in the humanitarian sector are more 
often internal and lifesaving.62 A review of publicly available policy documents indicates that evacuations 
carried out on humanitarian grounds are lifesaving tools that may be deployed when an individual or a 
group of individuals are at risk of deprivation of life or severe human rights violations.63 Evacuations are 
performed in a diversity of situations, in peacetime and conflict, with a vast contribution to policy coming 
from humanitarian evacuations and relocations in natural disasters.64 In the most material terms, human-
itarian evacuations are the voluntary movement of people from one place to another, usually within the 
boundaries of the same State, although sometimes outside it, to remove people from usually imminent 
danger. Features of urgency and emergency characterise evacuations, which are usually carried out in a 
shortened timeframe.65 In the humanitarian sector, moving people from one place to another for their 
protection is not limited to evacuations. Those are features shared by other notions, such as resettlements 
or planned relocations.66 
There is consensus that evacuations are to be conceived as temporary and are not in any way solutions;67 
for instance, NRC, in its policy on internal humanitarian evacuations, assesses that ‘evacuations are not a 
permanent solution’,68 stressing the temporary nature of evacuations. McAdam and Ferris also draw the line 
55  Jef Huysmans, ‘Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis’ (2002) 28 Review of International Studies 
599.
56  Istban Szilard and others, ‘International Organization for Migration: Experience on the Need for Medical Evacuation of Refugees during 
the Kosovo Crisis in 1999’ (2002) 43 Croatian medical journal 195.
57  Long, ‘In Search of Sanctuary’ (n 51).
58  Barutciski and Suhrke (n 52).
59  Szilard and others (n 56).
60  Barutciski and Suhrke (n 52).
61  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibili-
ty Sharing in Mass Influx Situations No. 100 (LV) - 2004’ (2004) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/41751fd82.html> accessed 16 June 2020.
62  Global Protection Cluster (GPC), ‘GPC Thematic Roundtable on Humanitarian Evacuations in Armed Conflict, 24 November 2014’ 
(2014) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/554b13eb4.html> accessed 18 June 2020.
63  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5).
64  Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights 
Protection in Situations of Natural Disasters (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement 2008).
65  Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future (Back-
ground Document. San Remo Consultation, 12-14 March 2014): Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement’ [2014] Brookings and George-
town University.
66  Jane McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change: Unpacking the Legal and Conceptual 
Issues’ (2015) 4 Cambridge International Law Journal 137.
67  Briggs (n 14).
68  Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), ‘Considerations for Planning Mass Evacuations of Civilians in Conflict Settings’ (2017) 12 <https://
www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/considerations-for-planning-mass-evacuations-of-civilians-in-conflict-settings> accessed 18 June 2020.
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between planned relocations and evacuations, suggesting that the latter are not to be considered perma-
nent but transient.69 Due to their temporary nature, evacuations are no substitute for political, state-cen-
tred solutions.70  The MEND Guide suggests that evacuations need to be tailored to the context and situa-
tions, and there is no ‘blueprint’ plan.71 Evacuations are considered very complex operations, with UNHCR 
suggesting that they ‘almost always need to involve a range of actors; the risk and complexity of human-
itarian evacuations are such that they often exceed the capacity of one organisation and thus demand a 
multi-sector approach’.72
Generally, policy documents on evacuations focus mainly on protecting the evacuees, and less on the ef-
fect of the broader protection space, although with some exceptions. While evacuation can be ‘critical pro-
tection measure[s]’,73 they also are characterised by grave dilemmas on whether and how to be deployed.74 
Regarding the notion of evacuations as a last-resort tool,75 some consider them to be an admission of fail-
ure to ensure protection and access by other means.76 While not the case for refugee evacuations, civilians’ 
evacuations in conflict may lead to displacement, with severe long-term consequences.77 Moreover, some 
alerts of the risk of ‘instrumentalisation’, which is, primarily in conflict, the inadvertent facilitation of political 
and military objectives,78 for instance, the facilitation of an ethnic cleansing process.79 Furthermore, when 
evacuations cannot be carried out to include the totality of the affected population, some argue that pri-
orities should be given to the most vulnerable.80 Others point out that considerations should also be given 
to the impact of the lack of evacuations for those who will be forced to stay.81
In this regard, according to UNHCR, ‘humanitarian evacuations must also always be a component of a 
broader protection strategy for communities-at-risk’,82 acknowledging the need for a comprehensive ap-
proach to the protection space in which the affected population is situated, in line with the ICRC ‘protection 
egg’ framework. Moreover, according to Global Protection Cluster’s Handbook for the Protection of the 
Internally Displaced, ‘planning humanitarian evacuations requires careful consideration of the potential 
negative impact on the human rights of evacuees and individuals in other affected communities’,83 effec-
tively recognising that the focus should be placed on both groups. Moreover, the Handbook, regarding 
internal evacuations, suggests that a possible risk of internal evacuations is the erosion of the principle 
of asylum, with host states possibly denying asylum,84 an instance similar to the negative consequences 
of the establishment of ‘safe zones’.85 In this regard, Long notes that while states sometimes close borders 
to mass influxes, that is truer for less-wealthy countries, while ‘developed nations with the capacity to run 
functioning bureaucracies are less crude in the methods they employ to circumvent asylum seekers’ rights 
because they are able to manipulate rather than close borders’.86
Therefore, an approach to evacuations must include an evaluation of their effect on the protection space, 
local and global, and relevantly on the protection of those who are not evacuated. What must be assessed 
is not just the number of evacuees or evaluation of the technical side of it. It is also about evaluating pro-
tection risks for the whole of a population: if and how those risks are lessened through the evacuation, and 
whether the evacuation generates new protection risks for the same population or other populations or 
communities. Attempting an evaluation of effectiveness in terms of protection of an international evacua-
tion is, therefore, an effort to evaluate its impact on different protection spaces, not only for the evacuees 
but for the broader population and with due consideration to the whole protection environment.
69  McAdam and Ferris (n 66).
70  Briggs (n 14).
71  Global CCCM Cluster, The MEND Guide Comprehensive Guide for Planning Mass Evacuations in Natural Disasters-Pilot Document (2014).
72  UNHCR, ‘Humanitarian Evacuations in Violence and Armed Conflict: Internal Note’ (2018) 20.
73  Briggs (n 14) 48.
74  Briggs (n 14).
75  Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (n 68); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5).
76  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5).
77  ibid.
78  ibid; Briggs (n 14).
79  Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7).
80  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5).
81  ibid.
82  UNHCR, ‘Humanitarian Evacuations in Violence and Armed Conflict’ (n 72) 7.
83  Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7) 434.
84  Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7).
85  Long, ‘In Search of Sanctuary’ (n 51).
86  ibid 461.
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3. Evacuation of Refugees through Resettlement
UNHCR currently engages in cross-border evacuations of refugees mainly by relying on resettlement. 
However, resettlement entails lengthy procedures, and evacuations require a compressed timespan. To 
merge the two, UNHCR has introduced a hybrid system of evacuations to a third country, in which ref-
ugees wait for their resettlement cases to be assessed. The peculiarity of combining evacuations with 
resettlement is that while, as mentioned above, humanitarian evacuations are considered in policy as 
immediate protection responses to situations that require swift actions, and they are temporary and 
not solutions,87 resettlement is one of three durable solutions of UNHCR. There is, therefore, an inherent 
tension between the fast, swift, lifesaving, temporary protection of humanitarian evacuations and the 
long-term protection and solution offered by resettlement,88 which is not easy to reconcile. Moreover, 
while resettlement may play a strategic role in broadening protection spaces in the country of departure 
and UNHCR acknowledges it, this component is not, for the agency, a foundation factor of operational 
engagement.89
UNHCR recognises the nature of resettlement as a protection tool and a durable solution.90 According to 
UNHCR in its Resettlement Handbook, resettlement serves three functions: (1) provide international pro-
tection and meet the specific needs of individual refugees, (2) it is one of the three ‘durable solutions’, 
the other two being voluntary repatriation and integration; (3) it can be a ‘tangible expression of inter-
national solidarity and a responsibility-sharing mechanism’.91 The three functions reflect the intertwined 
components of resettlement and how resettlement has a vital element of burden-sharing. However, while 
resettlement may partially be considered a burden-sharing tool, the proportion of refugees resettled each 
year is less than one per cent of the total number of refugees.92 Indeed, one of the features of resettlement 
is the lack of match between resettlement needs and resettlement places available. For instance, UNHCR 
forecasts, for 2021, there will be 403,287 cases in need of resettlement, or 1,445,383 persons.93 In contrast, 
in 2019, UNHCR submitted 81,671 cases for resettlement and departure amounted to 63,726.94 
Considering those limitations, UNHCR claims that the ‘strategic use of resettlement’ may have positive ef-
fects not just on resettled refugees but the broader protection space.95 EXCOM in 2003 defines strategic 
use of resettlement as ‘the planned use of resettlement in a manner that maximises the benefits, directly 
or indirectly, other than those received by the refugee being resettled’.96 However, UNHCR notes that those 
protection benefits are not the base of resettlement decisions and instead be perceived as additional and 
complementary positive externalities.97 
On the other hand, UNHCR resettlement Handbook suggests that resettlement from a country may be 
used in negotiations with that country’s government for fewer restrictions on refugees.98 For instance, UN-
HCR has used resettlement to decrease the risk of refoulement or attempt to improve access to detained ref-
ugees,99 as the case study on Libya will better show. The use of resettlement as an alternative to detention 
is not a novelty for UNHCR. In a 2006 UNHCR paper, Ophelia lists instances in which, to counteract a lack of 
legal protection against detention, UNHCR has employed resettlement and its promise to persuade state 
87  Briggs (n 14); Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (n 68).
88  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Resettlement: An Instrument of Protection and a Durable Solution’ 
(UNHCR 1996) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5215bdf34.html> accessed 10 June 2020.
89  UNHCR, ‘Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, 6-8 July 2010, UNHCR Position Paper on the Strategic Use of Reset-
tlement’ (2010) <https://www.unhcr.org/4fbcfd739.pdf> accessed 26 August 2020.
90  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Resettlement’ (n 88).
91  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011’ (2011) 3 <https://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf> accessed 13 August 2019.
92  UNHCR, ‘Resettlement’ (UNHCR) <https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html> accessed 26 August 2020.
93  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs - 2021’.
94  UNHCR, ‘Resettlement Data’ (UNHCR) <https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html> accessed 19 July 2020.
95  UNHCR, ‘Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, 6-8 July 2010, UNHCR Position Paper on the Strategic Use of Reset-
tlement’ (n 89).
96  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘The Strategic Use of Resettlement (A Discussion Paper Prepared by the 
Working Group on Resettlement)’ (2003) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/41597a824.html> accessed 26 August 2020.
97  UNHCR, ‘Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, 6-8 July 2010, UNHCR Position Paper on the Strategic Use of Reset-
tlement’ (n 89).
98  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011’ (n 91).
99  UNHCR, ‘Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, Geneva, 6-8 July 2010, UNHCR Position Paper on the Strategic Use of Reset-
tlement’ (n 89).
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authorities to release detained refugees.100 That happened in Indonesia, Thailand, and Nepal, three states 
that are not a party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.101
3.1 Evacuations, Emergency Resettlement and Emergency Transit Facilities
UNHCR assigns three levels of priority to its resettlement submission: emergency, urgent, and normal.102 
Emergency submissions are made when ‘the immediacy of security and/or medical condition necessi-
tates removal from the threatening conditions within a few days, if not within hours’.103 UNHCR’s objec-
tive regarding emergency cases is for refugees to depart for the resettling country within seven days of 
UNHCR submission to the country’s authorities.104 Emergency resettlement may be deployed in large-
scale emergencies105 when there is a lack of other protection solutions. However, ‘while [UNHCR] can 
undertake resettlement in emergencies, it cannot achieve emergency resettlement since it is inevitably a 
lengthy process’.106 Further proof of that is the data on emergency resettlement and waiting time: in 2009, 
the average period between submission and departure was 140 days,107 with only a few states providing 
prompt processing in a few days.108 
Therefore, while time is crucial when severe risks of abuses and violations are imminent, resettlement alone 
may not allow for sufficient rapidity. To circumvent that, UNHCR introduced a hybrid system of emergen-
cy evacuations to a third country, where resettlement submissions may then be assessed by prospective 
countries of asylum.109 UNHCR established in evacuation countries, through agreements with the coun-
tries’ governments, the Emergency Transit Facilities (ETFs), facilities to which refugees may be evacuated 
to safety and where resettlement countries could assess submissions.110 Usually, the agreements with the 
evacuation country might stipulate some requirements on: the maximum time of stay of the evacuees; the 
maximum number that is allowed at the same time; whether the evacuees will have freedom of movement; 
and whether and under which circumstances, usually exceptions, they will be able to apply for asylum in 
the country of evacuation.111
The ETFs bacme part of UNHCR policy after a set of ad-hoc interventions in which UNHCR evacuated ref-
ugees to third countries where they waited for resettlement. Those cases include: the evacuation in 1999 
and 2000 - that subsequently led to resettlement - of 1,500 Tutsis from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to Benin and Cameroon; the evacuations from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to Romania 4,500 refugees 
in 1999 to 2002; and of 450 Uzbek refugees from Kyrgyzstan to Romania in 2005 and 2006.112 According to 
UNHCR, while those operations were successful, they also ‘highlighted an acute lack of capacity to evac-
uate refugees at immediate risk as well as the limited options for emergency departures available with 
100  Field Ophelia, ‘Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ [2006] Legal and Protection Policy Research Series PO-
LAS/2006/03 (UNHCR, 2006).
101  UNHCR, ‘States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol’.
102  UNHCR, ‘Information Note: Emergency Resettlement and the Use of Temporary Evacuation Transit Facilities. Annual Tripartite Consul-
tations on Resettlement Geneva, 6 – 8 July 2010’ (n 2).
103  UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011’ (n 93) 246.
104  UNHCR, ‘Frequently Asked Questions about Resettlement’ (2013) <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ac0d7e52.pdf> accessed 15 July 
2020; UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011’ (n 91).\\uc0\\u8216{}UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011\\uc0\\u8217{} (n 93
105  Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, ‘Note on International Protection’ (UNHCR 2012) <https://www.ref-
world.org/docid/520b3a6a4.html> accessed 10 June 2020.
106  Guido Ambroso, ‘Bordering on a Crisis’ [2012] Forced Migration Review 6, 7.
107  UNHCR, ‘Information Note: Emergency Resettlement and the Use of Temporary Evacuation Transit Facilities. Annual Tripartite Consul-
tations on Resettlement Geneva, 6 – 8 July 2010’ (n 2).
108  ibid.
109  UNHCR, ‘Guidance Note on Emergency Transit Facilities: Timisoara, Romania / Manila, Philippines / Humenné, the Slovak Republic’ (n 
3).
110  UNHCR, ‘Information Note: Emergency Resettlement and the Use of Temporary Evacuation Transit Facilities. Annual Tripartite Consul-
tations on Resettlement Geneva, 6 – 8 July 2010’ (n 2).
111  UNHCR, ‘Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the International Organization for Migration Regarding Temporary Evacuation to Romania of Persons in Urgent Need of International Protection 
and Their Onward Resettlement’ (2008) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a7c221c2.html> accessed 27 July 2020; Republique du Niger and UN-
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resettlement countries’. 113 
In their original conception, the ETFs are a central tool for a protection strategy114 through which refugees 
who are at immediate risk of refoulement or life-threatening or severe physical damage115 may be swiftly 
evacuated, therefore drastically reducing their exposure to threats. In material terms, the ETFs offer tempo-
rary accommodation and security to refugees whose cases are being submitted for resettlement.116 While 
UNHCR may evacuate to ETFs refugees both individually and as a group,117 UNHCR 2010 Information Note 
and Recommendations suggests that ‘UNHCR does not have in mind the evacuation of large groups of ref-
ugees’118 possibly due to the need of a pre-acceptance or broader commitments by resettlement countries. 
Indeed, before a refugee is evacuated to an ETF, according to the Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR must 
secure that the refugee will be interviewed by a resettlement country or their dossier reviewed.119 That is 
to minimise the risk of having in the ETFs a high number of refugees who will not be resettled, limiting the 
slots available to other prospective evacuees.
Moreover, a vast number of evacuees who cannot be resettled could create frictions with the ETF country, 
which may have an agreement regarding the maximum time stay for each evacuee.120 For instance, the 
agreement among UNHCR, the Government of Romania and IOM makes explicit reference to a maximum 
stay period of six months. 121 By design, ETFs are intended and required to host refugees for a short time-
frame. Temporariness and transience are defining features of the facilities and are clear foundations of UN-
HCR agreements with governments. However, the agency acknowledged relatively soon, during the first 
phases of the ETFs programme, that the evacuations’ timing was not as rapid as initially envisioned. In par-
ticular, in the 2010 Information Note, which focuses on emergency cases, UNHCR noted that the timespan 
was not sufficient, as the average period between the request for evacuation and the effective movement 
was 28 days for evacuations to the ETF in Romania in 2009, and in general longer than planned.122 
To conclude, while the ETFs have allowed UNHCR to expand the protection space it may offer to refugees 
at the immediate risk of abuses, the programme’s unrolling is not as swift as initially envisioned. Structural 
limitations inherited from resettlement are only partially overcome. However, the ETFs have brought UN-
HCR to having an established lifesaving mechanism of protection for refugees in immediate need and cut 
the times of wait between a place or situation of danger to the arrival to a place of safety. It successfully es-
tablished a link between evacuations and emergency resettlement, allowing the latter to be used, through 
the mediation of an ETF, as a protection tool in emergencies, as the Libya case study will show.
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4. Evacuation and Resettlement Programme in Libya: Analysis and Outcomes 
The first large scale use of evacuations and resettlement through ETFs, coupled with direct evacuations, 
has been carried out since 2017 by UNHCR in Libya, with circa 4,500 refugees evacuated to date.123 
Evacuations are motivated by a shrunk protection space, with refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants 
facing severe human rights abuses and multiple protection risks. Spontaneous onward movements are 
constrained by geographical and political factors, and the ability to access protection spaces for refugees 
and asylum-seekers in the country or outside of its borders are extremely limited. This chapter will first 
introduce some of the most relevant elements regarding the protection environment in Libya, the lack 
of a functioning State and the struggles that UNHCR encounters in attempting to deliver protection in 
place. Then, it will unpack the evacuation programme, the pivotal role that a facility built in Tripoli was 
supposed to have and failed to deliver fully, and the outcomes of the programme.
4.1 Libya - Context and Protection Space  
Libyan political, governmental and power systems are fragmented124 since the country entered a phase of 
instability with the dethroning of Gaddafi in 2011.125 Currently, Libya finds itself divided, with no central 
authority capable of decisively and uniquely controlling the country.126 Several armed groups operate in 
Libya, many affiliated with government institutions, mainly the ministries of Defence, the Interior and Jus-
tice.127 The political instability, ongoing conflict, the proliferation of militias and lack of accountability are 
detrimental to the human rights of the local population and of refugees and other third nationals. Libya’s 
human rights situation is dire, with multiple reports of severe human rights violations. The Libyan judicia-
ry and the legal framework do not meet international standards, and all efforts to modify it are ‘hampered 
by the unstable environment, the dysfunction of legislative institutions, and political fragmentation’.128 
That has led to ‘widespread impunity’129 regarding armed groups. Arbitrary detention, unlawful depriva-
tion of liberty, torture and ill-treatment are widespread,130 with armed groups being the main perpetra-
tors, and both locals, for their political opinion, membership of a clan, tribe or family, and non-nationals 
being the targets.131 
Refugees’ protection space is degraded, and refugees are victims of severe abuses, whether detained or 
not.132 A 2016 report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) defined the situation of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants in 
Libya as a ‘human rights crisis’.133 The report summarises it by noting that ‘migrants and refugees [during 
the reporting period] continued to be routinely subjected to a range of serious human rights abuses and 
123  UNHCR, ‘Evacuation Factsheet - Libya’ (n 4).
124  Wolfram Lacher, Libya’s Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict (Bloomsbury Publishing 2020).
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violations. Perpetrators continued to operate with impunity’.134 Armed groups are involved in smuggling 
and human trafficking, side by side with criminal organisations and networks.135 Refugees and migrants 
are frequently victims of exploitation and buying and selling of individuals.136 Extortion is common, and 
even more so forced labour, in detention and not, at the hands of employers, smugglers, traffickers and 
detention centre guards.137 Refugees have little legal protection, as Libya lacks asylum legislation. The 
country is not a party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees nor the 1967 Protocol.138 More-
over, municipal law does not include any provision relating to non-refoulement.139 Instead, asylum-seekers 
and refugees are considered illegal immigrants.140 
Regarding the number of refugees, as of the 1st of October 2020, UNHCR had registered 45,661 refugees 
and asylum-seekers,141 and the most represented nationalities are Sudanese (34%), Syrian (32%), Eritrean 
(13%), Palestinian (9%), and Somali (6%)142. Regarding age, 33% are minors.143 Women account for 36% 
of registrations.144 However, registration data is inherently and structurally not representative of actual 
refugees. UNHCR follows the Libyan authorities determination that only persons of nine nationalities 
(Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Iraq, South Sudan and Yemen) have the right to claim 
international protection.145 According to IOM, the number of persons from one of the nine nationalities 
in Libya amounts to 20% of its total third-country nationals’ population.146 Conversely, the five leading 
countries of origin of migrants in Libya are Niger, Chad, Egypt, Sudan and Nigeria, which amounts to 72% 
of the migrant population in the country.147 It may be supposed that the figure UNHCR can officially gath-
er does not represent the total number of refugees in the country and, only partially, it might be used to 
understand the order of magnitude.
Some of the worst protection risks for refugees and asylum-seekers are found in detention and the cycle 
of exploitation, abuses, and violations connected. Even though Libyan law criminalises irregular migra-
tion,148 refugees and migrants are detained arbitrarily,149 with no legal proceeding supporting their incar-
ceration, no registration,150 no possibility to challenge it in a court of law,151 and more notably, indefinitely, 
usually for days or months.152 In detention centres, refugees and migrants ‘are routinely subjected to seri-
ous human rights violations and abuses, including prolonged arbitrary detention in inhuman conditions, 
enforced disappearance, trafficking, sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment’.153 They are also victims of 
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Rights in Libya, and the Effectiveness of Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Measures Received by the Government of Libya; Report of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (UN 2020) A/HRC/37/46 para. 81.
135  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), ‘“Detained and Dehuman-
ised” Report on Human Rights Abuses against Migrants in Libya’ (n 132).
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the ongoing conflict.154 Often detainees are forced to perform labour outside of the centres to buy their 
release, with conditions described as unbearable, which leads to their health deteriorating rapidly.155 
Extortion in detention is often reported and accompanied by torture.156 Rape and sexual violence are 
common, and refugee and migrant women are at heightened risk.157  
Detention is strictly connected to barriers to onward movements. Often, refugees and migrants are 
detained following interception at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)158 or are brought into detention 
centres by armed groups, smugglers, traffickers and private employers.159 The LCG, upon disembarkation, 
often hands over the returned persons to the Department for Combating Illegal Migrations (DCIM), which 
escorts them to detention centres, official and unofficial.160 In other instances, the intercepted are brought 
to private houses or farms, where they must perform forced labour and are victims of rape or other sexual 
violence.161 Detention may also occur at the hands of smugglers and traffickers, in warehouses, apart-
ments and the ‘connection houses’, smugglers run facilities where migrants are held during transit.162 
The LCG plays a central role in perpetuating the cycle of exploitation and abuses and is, through intercep-
tion at sea, one of the main barriers to onward movement and access to other protection spaces. In 2019, 
the LCG intercepted circa 9,000 refugees and migrants,163 many of whom were subsequently detained by 
the DCIM or other entities. One of the most widely used words to depict refugees’ and migrants’ situation 
in Libya is ‘trapped’.164 There is a system structured around their exploitation, and their onward movement 
is blocked. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports ‘significant evidence’ that smugglers directly collude with 
the State.165 UNSMIL confirms it and reports that, according to credible sources, state institutions and local 
officers are involved in smuggling and trafficking.166 There are also further reports of strong links between 
smuggling, detention and armed groups due to financial incentives.167 It is evident that refugees face 
multiple and severe abuses and violations, that they are in a system of exploitation, and that their onward 
movement is constrained. 
4.2 UNHCR Evacuation Programme 
UNHCR’s work in Libya is subject to limitations, many of which are ascribed to the lack of a functional 
state and the relatively scarce cooperation of the formally existent institutions. UNHCR has a modus ope-
randi and an operation habit of engaging primarily and mostly with State institutions,168 and much less 
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tradition, experience, and capacity to engage with armed groups to deliver protection.169 As the preferred 
natural counterpart is weak, corrupted, and fragmented, the agency struggles in delivering protection 
in place. Moreover, security conditions negatively affect the capacity of the agency to access refugees 
and asylum-seekers.170 As mentioned above, Libya is not a party to the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees nor the 1967 Protocol. UNHCR has worked since 1991 in the country, but it has not signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the government, an exception compared to usual practice.171 
UNHCR run since late-2017 the evacuation and resettlement programme, mainly through ETFs.172 Until 
October 2020, UNHCR had evacuated to safety circa 4,500 people to ETFs in Niger, Rwanda, Romania, and 
directly to Italy and other countries,173 many of whom were resettled to a third country or had access to 
a decent protection space in the country of evacuation. According to the UNHCR data portal, updated 
to the 15th of October 2020, UNHCR evacuated 4,432 persons in 35 evacuations since the beginning of 
the programme.174 Of those, 3,165 were evacuated to Niger, 808 to Italy and 306 to Rwanda.175 It should 
be noted that the publishing is not consistent with other UNHCR factsheets, as the 2019 Libya factsheet 
notes that during the year, on top of the three above mentioned countries, 452 individuals were evacuat-
ed to Romania, where UNHCR runs with IOM an ETC, and 382 to other countries.176 
Regarding the place of departure, 2,306 (54%) persons were evacuated directly from detention centres, 
1,605 (37.5%) were hosted in the Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF) before the evacuation and 
368 (8.5%) were in urban settings.177 2,885 were males (67%), 1,424 females (33%); 1,324 were children 
(31%).178 Regarding nationalities, 84% of the evacuees were Eritrean, 8% Somali, circa 5% Sudanese and 
circa 3% Ethiopians. The year with the highest number of evacuees was 2018 (2,228), followed by 2019 
(1,534).179 In those two years, UNHCR evacuated 85% of the total for the programme so far, although the 
COVID-19 pandemic has enormously restricted the agency’s capacity for carrying out evacuations in 
2020. The pandemic halted the evacuation programme from March for several months, with the pro-
gramme resuming in October.180  
Initially, the programme focused solely on refugees in detention as an alternative to it, yet UNHCR shifted 
its evacuation policy and begun evacuating refugees ‘mostly from urban settings with a history of be-
ing in a detention centre before being released’.181 Before the policy shift, according to UNHCR, persons 
bribed the guards of detention centres to be detained and then be able to access the UNHCR programme 
of evacuation and resettlement.182 In 2019, two-thirds of the evacuees were persons released from de-
tention and one-third urban refugees, with UNHCR planning, before the pandemic and the closing of the 
GDF (discussed below), to shift this proportion to fifty-fifty.183 Due to difficulty accessing refugees and 
asylum-seekers, it is not easy for UNHCR to determine whom they are evacuating in terms of the need for 
international protection, with some priorities being given to children and women.184 Moreover, due to the 
Libyan authorities’ decision on only nine nationalities being allowed to register with the agency (albeit 
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with minor exceptions),185 UNHCR may not be able to evacuate persons who, while they may be in need 
of international protection, do not fall into one of the nine nationalities.186 
4.2.1 The Gathering and Departure Facility
Due to the operation’s complexity, barriers to access and in supporting evacuation procedures, UNHCR 
opened in late 2018 in Tripoli the Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF), a centre with a capacity for 
hosting circa 600 people187 and with the scope of easing and streamlining evacuations, and through 
which 1,605 evacuees transited. 188 UNHCR introduced the facility as an alternative to detention for the 
many trapped in Libyan detention centres.189 The first evacuation from the GDF occurred in December 
2018.190 The agency considers the reception centre to be serving to support the evacuation of refugees by 
guaranteeing and offering a space in which refugees awaiting evacuation may be physically located and 
protected. The GDF was in operation particularly in 2019, when most evacuees transited through there 
before their flights out of the country,191 before the facility’s shutdown in early 2020. 
In total, the facility was opened for circa 15 months, of which many were characterised by overcrowding 
due to spontaneous arrivals and loss of original purpose. UNHCR closed the GDF at the end of January 
2020, citing fears ‘for the safety and protection of people at the facility, its staff and partners amid wors-
ening conflict in Tripoli, Libya’.192 According to Jean-Paul Cavalieri, Chief of Mission in Libya, the decision 
was taken as the Libyan government established a training place for military and police personnel in land 
adjacent to the GDF.193 Moreover, the decision came after, on the 2nd of January 2020, shelling landed 
close to the facility.194 Libyan authorities’ choice to position a training camp very closely to the GDF may 
be interpreted as an implicit decision to close the centre, as Libyan authorities reject the establishment of 
internationally run shelters for refugees and migrants.195
Independence in the running of the GDF was severely undermined by the Libyan authorities, who exer-
cised vast de facto control over the facility.196 AP described the centre as effectively run by local militias, 
with armed guards controlling it as a prison.197 The news agency also reports severely unsanitary condi-
tions.198 Similarly, MSF described the GDF in late 2019 as run primarily by Libyan authorities, ‘without un-
hindered access to international agencies nor freedom of movement for those held there’.199  By January 
2020, the GDF had already stopped working as a transit centre for evacuations.200 
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4.2.2 ETFs and Direct Evacuations
Regarding the options for hosting evacuees, UNHCR has mainly worked with ETFs in Niger, Romania and 
more recently Rwanda, and arranged direct evacuations to Italy. Regarding the ETFs, while the Romanian 
centre has been operating since 2008,201 for the Libya situation, UNHCR established two ETFs, one in Niger 
and one in Rwanda. The establishment of the two facilities may be considered an accomplishment and 
evidence of the agency being able to negotiate extra protection space through this mechanism success-
fully. The agreements between UNHCR and the two countries guarantees a maximum capacity of 1,100 
evacuees in the two countries.202 The ETFs are central to the evacuation and resettlement programme, 
as they allow for resettlement procedures to be completed in a place of safety and, with no other coun-
try except for Italy having agreed to direct evacuations, they are necessary for the unrolling of the pro-
gramme.
The ETF in Niger opened in November 2017, with UNHCR signing an MoU with the Government of Niger 
shortly after.203 The agreement between UNHCR and Niger provides that evacuees may stay in the coun-
try for up to six months, and renewal may be granted on exceptional individual bases.204 Moreover, if no 
other solution is available,  Niger does not exclude, exceptionally and for a limited number of persons, 
granting asylum in the country to individual evacuees.205 Niger agreed to accept refugees, asylum-seekers 
registered with UNHCR, stateless persons and unaccompanied minors.206 Asylum-seekers’ claim to inter-
national protection will be assessed by UNHCR.207 In general, no more than 600 evacuees may simultane-
ously be on the territory of Niger at the same time.208 As of July 2020, UNHCR had evacuated 3,208 refu-
gees and asylum-seekers,209of which 2,454 had been resettled to third countries,210 with no evacuations 
or resettlements carried out since the beginning of the pandemic.211 There is notably a difference of little 
less than eight hundred between evacuees and resettled. 
Regarding the ETF in Rwanda, the facility has been operational since 2019, with the signing of an MoU 
between UNHCR, the Government of Rwanda and the African Union. The agreement provides for a max-
imum of 500 persons hosted in the ETF at any given time.212 The ETF is in Bugesera District, 60 kilometres 
from Kigali, the capital.213 The Rwanda ETF has to date been used less than the Niger ETF, also due to the 
pandemic, which has halted operations. However, the two coupled are offering 1,100 places of safety for 
evacuees, whose evacuation may be carried out swiftly. Both the Niger and Rwanda ETFs are funded by 
the EU Emergency Trust for Africa (EUTF).214
Due to the agreements in place with Niger and Rwanda, UNHCR is not able to evacuate as many refugees 
as needed, as there is a maximum number of refugees who may be hosted simultaneously in each ETF, 
and for places to become available, the resettlement of refugees to a third country is required.215 Resettle-
ment is a slow process,216 even when the submissions are categorised as emergency or urgent, as in the 
case of refugees evacuated from Libya. Therefore, the turnover in the ETFs is not swift enough to allow for 
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an increased number of refugees evacuated from Libya.217
The third main channel for evacuations is Italy, which has received 808 direct evacuees from Libya218 and 
several other evacuees from the ETFs,219 of which 105 from Niger,220 since the beginning of the pro-
gramme. As noted above, Italy is the only country that has directly received a sizeable number of evacu-
ees not for being resettled to a third country. Evacuations from Libya are ad-hoc arrangements between 
the Italian Government and UNHCR. They might be conceived as lighter resettlements: evacuees upon 
arrival are treated as asylum-seekers, with no automatic recognition of any status, and their asylum claims 
are standardly processed.221 In comparison, Italy also has a standard resettlement programme through 
which it resettled 75 refugees from Libya in 2019.222 
To conclude, while resettlement faltered globally, in 2019 UNHCR in Libya resettled through evacuations 
one refugee every 20, which is more than the global average.223 Although the numbers are comparatively 
good, the dire conditions in Libya do not allow for much celebration and instead require further analysis 
of the impact of evacuations on the non-evacuated, which is introduced in the next chapter. Interestingly, 
to supply for the lack of resettlement slots and as a systematic alternative to detention for Libya, UNHCR 
is also investigating the option of supporting voluntary returns to the country of origin and return to the 
first country of asylum.224 However, UNHCR is encountering resistance in at least some refugees and asy-
lum-seekers who have a preference for continuing seeking asylum autonomously.225
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5. Evacuations’ Impact on Protection Spaces of the Non-Evacuated
As researched in the previous chapter, the protection space in Libya is shrunk, and the evacuations carried 
out by UNHCR have proven effective in creating new protection spaces in other countries, having evacu-
ated, to October 2020, circa 4,500 refugees. However, as evidenced above, the correspondence between 
needs and protection solutions is insufficient, with a high proportion of refugees not being evacuated. 
Therefore, an analysis of the programme must also assess whether the evacuation programme had an 
impact on the protection spaces of the non-evacuated, in particular regarding the protection space within 
Libya, with a focus on alternatives to detention and researched in the following section, and regionally 
regarding refugee’s onward movement, researched in the second section of this chapter.
It is also helpful to note that evacuations are usually conceived as a last resort and often a one-off tool,226 
while the UNHCR programme in Libya is increasingly acquiring, after more than three years at the centre 
of the migration route, a structural character. Moreover, the evacuation programme in Libya touches upon 
many debates in the refugee protection world: a country in conflict, through which transits one of the main 
routes to Europe, the externalisation of borders and the tools that the EU is developing and testing to curb 
irregular migration,227 which includes a significant number of refugees and asylum-seekers, and the role of 
refugees’ own protection choices.  
5.1 Local Protection Space
Whether the evacuation programme has had a positive or negative effect on the protection space avail-
able to non-evacuated refugees and asylum-seekers is hard to assess. There is an underlying moral dilem-
ma, as old as humanitarian action: better save a few, or work for a structural change which will benefit a 
more significant number, but not in the short-term? Evacuations in Libya’s context may have been an at-
tempt to reconcile the two: according to the ICRC ‘protection egg’ framework,228 humanitarian protection 
is multidimensional, with responsive actions needing the complementarity of the environment changing 
actions.229 UNHCR has used evacuations to propose an alternative to detention to the Libyan authorities, 
in line with the strategic dimension of resettlement researched in chapter three. Moreover, through the 
strategic use of the GDF, although the project proved unsustainable and Libyan authorities undermined 
it, UNHCR partially showed that the UN and other international humanitarian actors might support state 
institutions and offer protection to refugees in the country. 
In a January 2020 hearing before the Italian Chamber of Deputies’ External Affairs Commission, UNHCR 
Chief of Mission in Libya, Jean-Paul Cavalieri, acknowledged that the Libya government was showing a 
fair amount of goodwill, but that clashed with structural constraints, partly due to the ongoing conflict.230 
Cavalieri also suggested that civil servants have a double loyalty, one to the government and its hierar-
chies and one to the tribe they come from, therefore rendering the system of government less vertical 
than its formal structure would suggest.231 The fragmented government structure means that UNHCR 
needs to engage in parallel negotiations throughout multiple chains of command,232 many of which are 
unofficial. It is unclear whether evacuations are facilitating or complicating the long list of humanitarian 
negotiations needed to decrease the risks and threats of abuses to which refugees are subject.233 
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Regarding alternatives to detention, according to Cavalieri, there is a certain degree of willingness in the 
Ministry of Interior to close all detention centres.234 The Ministry, however, requires UN agencies to step 
in supporting refugees directly with cash grants and allowances, which UNHCR cannot do extensively.235 
Moreover, UNHCR signals some signs of progress in its advocacy concerning the government looking 
at alternatives to arbitrary detention236 and, at the very least, introducing regular legal proceedings and 
legal guarantees for detainees and judicial control over detention centres.237 UNHCR reports the gov-
ernment’s goodwill on curbing the severe human rights violations in detention, which clashes with the 
reality on the ground,238 where armed groups act independently and with impunity. 
Regarding the number of refugees in detention, in August 2020, UNHCR estimates 2,500 non-nationals 
were held in detention, of which 1,212 of concern to the agency.239 To offer a numerical comparison, UN-
SMIL in 2016 put the figure of detained refugees and migrants at between 4,000 and 7,000 individuals.240 
However, it is not clear whether the figures had been collected similarly enough to make them effectively 
comparable. According to UNHCR, the number of non-nationals in detention decreased in 2019 and early 
2020, before rising again in mid-2020.241 Cavalieri explained the steady decrease in that period was due to 
two factors: the exacerbation of the conflict, with militias and state authorities being unable or unwilling 
to access the basic resources required to run centres, in particular food and in particular for those deten-
tion centres closer to front lines; and to UNHCR evacuations – circa 30% of detainees had been evacuated 
to third countries in 2019.242 
UNHCR, elsewhere, offers other possible explanations for this decrease, stating a reduced number of 
attempted crossings, increased release upon disembarkation, effective advocacy on release to the urban 
community, and severe lack of funding at the DCIM.243 A report by The New Humanitarian suggests a 
severe issue with food provision in the detention centres, structural but that profoundly worsened during 
2019 and 2020.244 Moreover, the conflict worsened the coordination between the Ministry of Interior and 
the LCG. That has led to a lesser percentage of persons returned to Libya by the LCG being arrested and 
transported to detention centres, with UNHCR in January 2020 estimating that circa 30-35% of those 
returned are not detained.245
Therefore, while through evacuations, UNHCR may have attempted to show the Libyan government an 
exceptional commitment to providing alternatives to detention, there is no evidence that the programme 
has produced any positive effect on detention policies and practices. On the other hand, as researched in 
the second chapter, some aid professionals consider, in general, evacuations as an admission of failure to 
expertise and the need for overt political engagement more visible than for organizations promoting refugee protection in fluid, politically plu-
ralistic urban sites. Building on fieldwork in Johannesburg, Kampala and Nairobi, we argue that neutrality, technical fixes and demands for direct 
and targeted service delivery can undermine long-term urban protection. Rather, protection requires enhanced local literacy and pursuing back 
routes to rights through engagement with municipal authorities, local actors and policy sectors. In other words, humanitarian organizations must 
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ensure protection by other means.246 It cannot be disregarded the possibility that the evacuation en-
gagement decision is, inadvertently, a statement of failure and an admission that a protection space with 
minimum protection standards in Libya is unattainable, therefore discouraging the search for alternative 
solutions.
5.2 Regional Protection Spaces and Onward Movement
The second component of an analysis of the impact of evacuations on non-evacuees entails, as Libya 
is notoriously a transit country, the onward movement of refugees and a broader notion of protection 
space that include regional dynamics, mainly focused on the relationship between Libya and the EU on 
migration containment policies. The onward movement of refugees is indeed central to the assessment. 
Refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants are willing to take enormous risks to arrive in Europe. The rate of 
fatalities in the attempted crossing to Europe in the central Mediterranean route is very high, with IOM 
estimating the figure at 4.8% in 2019, the highest in the period 2015-2019.247 Moreover, the interception 
rate has increased to 41% of all attempts in 2019, up from 16% in 2017.248 That pushes up the fatalities 
rate when calculated on the number of successful attempts: 7.8% in 2019.249 Roughly, in 2019 for every 
12 who reached the coasts of Europe, one has died. As stated earlier, while the risk is exceptionally high, 
people are willing to undertake it to reach Europe. 
As reported above, UNHCR, when suggesting the opportunity to be evacuated to the first country of 
asylum to refugees in detention centres in Libya, received some negative answers from refugees already 
committed to smugglers or ready to.250 If persons are willing to first remain inside Libyan detention cen-
tres and then undertake an activity in which one participant will die for every 12 successful, there is space 
for reflection on what refugees themselves conceive as effective protection and what they are willing to 
risk to achieve it. Moreover, as UNHCR reports, evacuations for detainees are at least at the micro-level a 
partial pull factor, with the agency reporting refugees and asylum-seekers entering detention centres on 
purpose, in the hope of being evacuated.251 Whether evacuations are a pull factor for refugees who are 
out of Libya is less clear.
In an apparent paradox, the EU is a major donor of the evacuations and ETFs programme, and Italy is 
the only country with a sizeable number of direct evacuations, while the two actors are also directly 
supporting the LCG since 2017. 252 The entity, as researched above, bears much direct responsibility in 
blocking onward movement and in the detention of refugees and migrants that underpins systemic 
torture, ill-treatment, and other abuse patterns. Italy has taken the lead in the EU effort to outsource the 
implementation of its migration control policy to non-EU countries,253 with the former delivering ca-
pacity-building, vessels and vehicles to the LCG.254 Due to the clear and widely known relation between 
interception at sea, detention, and conditions of detention characterised as inhumane and degrading, 
HRW and Amnesty suggest that the EU and Italy may be considered effectively complicit in those human 
rights abuses, having actively supported and enlarged the capacity of the LCG to intercept refugees, 
asylum-seekers and migrants at sea.255 The support for the LCG seems to be an effective externalisation of 
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border control, 256 as the number of people who managed to reach an EU country by boat from Libya has 
decreased steadily between 2017 and May 2020.257 
The paradox is indeed apparent. The evacuation programme recalls some of the features of a project tout-
ed by some EU member states of establishing asylum-processing centres in North Africa, on the lines of 
the Australian model.258 The fact that Italy is the only wealthy country that has an evacuation programme 
from Libya, and at the same is at the forefront of the support for the LCG and has over the years taken 
stances in favour of returns to Libya,259 is a clear statement of intentions, that echoes the EU position: refu-
gees are welcomed only in the way and in the numbers the Union agrees to receive them.260 Spontaneous 
initiatives are not appreciated and instead repressed.261 The stance is not new, and it has been observed 
in many wealthy countries around the globe over the years, in particular when arguments are made that 
generosity through resettlement, the ‘humanitarian alibi’,262 allows the country to engage in border con-
trol practices that are against the spirit of refugee law, if not in direct violation of it.263 A recent example 
of that is the UK’s ‘New Plan for Immigration’,264 which, according to UNHCR, introduces ‘a discriminatory 
two-tiered approach to asylum’265 by differentiating between resettled refugees and refugees that arrive 
irregularly, and make for the latter ‘access to asylum and protection in the UK […] infinitely more chal-
lenging’.266
Due to this apparent paradox, it can be agued that evacuations are instrumentalised for justifying con-
tainment and externalisation policies that restrict spontaneous access to safe protection spaces through 
the curtailing of spontaneous onward movement. It is not surprising to note that one of the most noto-
rious European proponents of containment policies, Mr Salvini, when serving as the Italian Minister of 
Interior, welcomed a photo-op of himself greeting a group of refugees evacuated to Italy through Niger 
at the bottom of the stairs of the plane, playing with a child and contextually declaring that evacuations 
were ‘the only safe route’.267 There is a very clear risk that evacuations might negatively affect non-evac-
uated, as they both provide a ‘humanitarian alibi’ to wealthier countries to curtail refugees’ search for 
protection spaces and create an incentive for wealthier countries to not look for structural protection 
solutions to the mass movement of refugees and asylum-seekers.
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6. Conclusions
This paper examined evacuations of refugees, which are international in character and features. It did so 
by vastly building, through a case study, on publicly available policy documents on evacuations whose 
majority, if not all, cover internal evacuations of civilians.268 The essay introduced notions of refugee 
protection concerning evacuations and movement and how and when evacuations are deployed, by hu-
manitarian agencies, mainly internally in conflict or disasters, and seldom internationally for refugees.269 
In recent years, UNHCR has developed a new tool for performing mass evacuations of refugees. That is 
the combination of evacuations with resettlement, through using dedicated facilities in third countries, 
the ETFs, in which evacuees wait for their resettlement submissions to be processed. The most prominent 
use of this mechanism has been taking place since 2017 for evacuations from Libya, a country in which 
refugee protection in place is made especially difficult by widespread severe violations and abuses, civil 
war, and lack of stable institutions. The UNHCR refugee evacuation and resettlement programme had to 
October 2020 brought to safety 4,500 persons270 and has suggested that evacuation with resettlement 
might be more than a last resort protection tool and a solution in its own right for evacuees. 
However, besides the operational successes, there are more dimensions to an analysis of evacuations, for 
which this essay has used the notion of protection space. As shown in the second chapter, the available 
policy and literature point out the need to consider the impact of evacuations on all communities at risk,271 
including the non-evacuated.272 Evacuations are positively disruptive, and they have consequences on 
multiple protection spaces, including in the country from which evacuations are carried out, and, more so 
in the case of refugees, internationally. In particular, policy and literature suggest a list of risks that need to 
be considered before planning or engaging in an evacuation. 
Two of the commonly cited risks in internal evacuation policies are the instrumentalisation for military 
or political purposes273 and that ‘evacuations can provide an excuse for people to avoid seeking a more 
sustainable solution to the crisis’.274 According to this research, international refugee evacuations carry the 
same risks, with a stronger focus on the political than on the military. As investigated in the case study, 
the Libya programme clashes with EU policies and practices that contravene the spirit and possibly the 
provisions of refugee law,275 and it may, inadvertently, legitimise them by functioning as a fig leafInterna-
tional refugee evacuations are highly political, and they may become the ‘humanitarian alibi’ for restric-
tive policies, which, as shown in the case study, increases the non-evacuated refugees’ exposure to risks. 
Besides the instrumentalisation, there is a possibly more nefarious risk: the political inaction regarding 
solutions. As mentioned above, the risk is that evacuations may provide an excuse and hide under hu-
manitarian action the political responsibility for searching for a solution. NRC guidelines clearly state that 
‘evacuations […] should never be seen as a substitute for a political solution to a crisis’.276 When review-
ing the case study, the evacuation programme is in its third year, and, while it started as an emergency 
programme to evacuate detained refugees, it is becoming structural. It sits at the centre of one migration 
route to Europe, and it does not provide a comprehensive protection solution for refugees in search of 
spaces that may give them effective protection. Nor should it, as the responsibility for protection lies ulti-
mately with states, and in this case, the international community.277 As observed, apart from some efforts 
by UNHCR to decrease risks in Libya, there is no concrete prospect of a comprehensive political solution 
in the country or structurally for the migration route that goes through it. 
268  Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7); Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (n 68); Global Protection Cluster (GPC), ‘Ukraine, Note on the 
Evacuation of Civilians from Conflict Affected Areas’ (2015); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5); 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), ‘IOM Key Principles for Internal Humanitarian Evacuations/Relocations of Civilian Populations in 
Armed Conflict’ (2014); UNHCR, ‘Humanitarian Evacuations in Violence and Armed Conflict’ (n 72); Global Protection Cluster (GPC) (n ); Global 
CCCM Cluster (n 71).
269  Global Protection Cluster (GBP) (n 7).
270  UNHCR, ‘Evacuation Factsheet - Li7bya’ (n 4).
271  UNHCR, ‘Humanitarian Evacuations in Violence and Armed Conflict’ (n 72).
272  Briggs (n 12).
273  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and InterAction Roundtable (n 5).
274  Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (n 69) 14.
275  d’Argent and Kuritzky (n ).
276  Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (n 68) 46.
277  Hugh Breakey, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Overlap and Contrast’ [2013] (:unav) 
<https://www.un-ilibrary.org/human-rights-and-refugees/norms-of-protection_a35383ff-en> accessed 22 September 2019; Nicolò Cantini and 
Dmitry Zavialov, ‘Fixing Responsibility to Protect: Lessons from and Proposals for the Case of Libya’ (2018) 2 Peace Human Rights Governance 75.
International Evacuations of Refugees and Impact on Protection Spaces 25
In the meantime, refugees continue to search for protection solutions autonomously. The global pro-
tection of refugees is very much based on freedom of movement, non-refoulement278 and the possibility 
of accessing an environment conducive to protection.279 As demonstrated in the second chapter, while 
approaches to protection in conflict are rooted in protection from violence,280 the protection of refugees 
requires one further dimension: the realisation of a new durable space where the effects of displacement 
are mitigated, therefore fulfilling protection.281 As Stevens suggests, this has much to do with the coun-
try in which the refugee may end up being.282 That is relevant in assessing risks connected to refugees’ 
international evacuations, which should not hamper the autonomous research of protection spaces of 
the non-evacuated. 
A last risk mentioned in internal evacuations policies is that ‘an evacuation can raise expectations for 
evacuations elsewhere or at a later stage’283 and that they may raise ‘unrealistic expectations about the 
capacities and roles of humanitarian actors’.284 That could also apply to evacuations of refugees, more so 
when they are not ad-hoc one-time interventions and instead become structural features of a protection 
environment, and even more so when they are coupled with resettlement, therefore offering a compre-
hensive solution to displacement. On the one hand, the case study shows reports of refugees who had 
paid to be detained, in inhumane conditions, to attempt to access evacuations and resettlements.285 
While anecdotal, it signals that evacuations may have consequences on individuals’ spontaneous self-pro-
tection choices286 and strategies.287 
To conclude, this research focuses on establishing a framework of analysis and extracting from the case 
study some protection considerations that could be useful in future research and assessment. Policy on in-
ternal evacuations in conflict often agrees that, while assessing risks is central, there might exist situations 
in which the affected populations’ protection needs could be that severe to require accepting those risks.288 
The same reasoning could be applied to the case study, while it is beyond this essay’s scope to establish it. 
In all cases, negative externalities of evacuations need to be recognised, assessed, and necessary measures 
put in place to mitigate them so that protection spaces of the non-evacuated are minimally affected.
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